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In UK public service broadcasting, recent regulatory change has increased 
the role of the private sector in television production, culminating in the 
BBC’s recent introduction of ‘creative competition’ between in-house and 
independent television producers. Using the concept of ‘cognitive distance’, 
this paper focuses on the increasing role of the independent sector as a 
source of creativity and innovation in the delivery of programming for the 
BBC. The paper shows that the intended benefits of introducing new 
competencies into public service broadcasting have been thwarted by, on the 
one hand, a high level of cognitive proximity between in-house and external 
producers and, on the other, a conflict in values between the BBC and the 
independent sector, with the latter responding to a commercial imperative 
that encourages creativity in profitable genres, leaving gaps in other areas of 
provision. While recent regulatory reform appears to have had a limited 
impact on the diversity of programming, it does suggest a closer alignment 
of programme content with the imperatives of capital. Implications for the 
literature on communities of practice are noted.  
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In UK public service broadcasting, recent regulatory change has increased the 
role of the private sector in television production, culminating in the BBC’s 
introduction of ‘creative competition’ between in-house and independent 
television producers (‘indies’). The Window of Creative Competition (WOCC), 
established under the BBC Charter and Agreement in April 2007, requires that 
25% of programmes commissioned by the BBC are open to external 
competition, ‘to maximise the quality of on-screen programming by creating a 
meritocracy for ideas’ (BBC Trust, 2008, p. 31). This motivation is line with, 
but in addition to, the existing 25% independent television production quota 
specified in the 1990 Broadcasting Act. Indies have been successful in the 
WOCC, winning three quarters of the commissions available through the 
competition (Ibid, p. 33). These regulatory and organisational changes can be 
understood as an attempt to promote creativity and diversity in programming by 
exploiting a domain of production competencies outside the BBC. This accords 
with the rise of market-oriented thinking in UK government policy in the 
organisation of the delivery of public services since the late 1970s. This paper 
argues that, while such changes appear to have had a limited impact on the 
diversity of programming, they do suggest a closer alignment of programme 
content with the imperatives of capital. 
This argument is developed by viewing the reforms through two contrasting 
theoretical lenses, communities of practice (CoPs) theory and the analysis of 
institutional change. The first part of the paper traces the impact of reform on 
the television production communities serving the BBC. In the field of 
organisational learning, a body of literature has grown up which examines 
learning and innovation through interfirm relationships. In particular, the 
concept of ‘cognitive distance’ has been developed to predict the virtue of 
collaboration among different economic units according to their variation in 
knowledge and competencies (Nooteboom, 1999; 2000; 2008). Mutual 
understanding will be promoted among individuals who share similar mental 
schemas (cognitive proximity), but creativity is more likely to arise from the 
interaction of individuals with differing competencies (cognitive distance), as 
‘the friction of competing ideas can ignite innovation’ (Nooteboom, 2008, p. 
129). Although competencies may vary between organisations, such differences 
cannot be understood without referring to the more fundamental environment or 
social ‘milieu’ constitutive of cognition, as the mental schemas of individuals 
reflect the social and material environment in which their ‘categories of thought’ 
have developed. The locus of competencies can be situated within more 




consist of members that learn and develop knowledge through repeated 
interaction without necessarily belonging to the same formal organisation. The 
regulatory and organisational reforms affecting the BBC can be analysed by 
examining their impact on the sociology of learning within production CoPs, 
understood as a key source of creativity for the BBC and other television 
producers within the broadcasting industry.   
While affording a fine-grained analysis of innovation practices, micro-
perspectives on creativity such as CoPs theory have received criticism for 
neglecting the wider institutional and regulatory context of industries and its 
enduring influence on the prospects of firms (Roberts, 2006; Lave, 2008). The 
second part of this paper addresses this issue by deconstructing the reforms to 
the broadcasting industry as a socio-political process of institutional change. By 
creating new rules and practices of interaction, processes of institutional change 
impinge upon or afford new forms of behaviour among firms and communities. 
Attending to the agents of change, in this case the actions of government and 
industry stakeholders, is critical in order to account for the character of the 
production landscape that emerged through the reforms. Taking into account 
change in the dynamics of communities and institutions, this article addresses 
two questions: how does the variety of competencies available to the BBC 
through the WOCC arrangement contribute to the delivery of effective public 
service broadcasting; and what effect has institutional change had on the 
strategies of commissioned organisations and creativity and diversity in 
programming? 
In the next section, the construct of cognitive distance among communities (2.1) 
and processes of institutional change are described (2.2). The methodology used 
to conduct the research on the UK broadcasting industry is then described in 
section 3, prior to the presentation and evaluation of the findings from the 
empirical work (sections 4 and 5).  
 
2. Innovation in communities and institutions  
 
2.1 Cognitive variety 
The notion of cognitive distance represents the level of variation in the 
interpretive schemes of different individuals. Cognition is understood as the 
‘mental schemas’ through which individuals perceive, interpret, and generally 
make sense of the environment. A schema is a meta-representation that subsists 
within the mind as ‘an organized framework of objects and relations that has yet 
to be filled in with concrete detail’ (D’Andrade, 1995, p. 122). Individuals 
develop schematic scenes or pictures through participation in activity and in 




constructivist theory of knowledge which situates practices of learning within 
specific social contexts and cultural communities. As Nooteboom (1999) notes, 
social embedding produces variation in practices of knowing: ‘If knowledge is 
contingent upon categories of thought, and these develop in interaction with the 
physical and social environment, then cognition is path-dependent and 
idiosyncratic. People will be able to understand each other only to the extent that 
they have developed their categories in a shared environment and in mutual 
interaction’ (p.140). Using the heuristic of cognitive distance, it is possible to 
imagine the collaborative relations between different agents according to a 
spectrum of interaction, defined at the one end by proximity and understanding 
and at the other by distance and novelty. 
 
At the level of the firm, evolutionary approaches suggest that cognition is 
embedded in the firm’s collective routines that allow organisations to perform a 
range of behaviour competently. As with the performance of individual skills, 
organisational routines are programmatic, tacit and, with frequent use, 
performed automatically (Nelson and Winter, 1982). The negative corollary to 
the ‘automaticity’ of routine behaviour is the loss of diversity and flexibility in 
performance. In a dynamic market environment, firms need to adapt their 
routines to innovate and sustain a competitive advantage. To overcome 
cognitive proximity, organisations seek access to external knowledge through a 
variety of interfirm relationships, from arm’s length market-based contracts 
through to more collaborative hybrid or network forms (Powell, 1990; Deakin et 
al., 2009). 
 
The effect of cognitive variety on organisational learning can be studied at an 
intermediate ontological level, the dynamics of communities situated within or 
beyond the hierarchy. Learning takes place through the everyday practices of 
social communities that do not necessarily coincide with the formal boundaries 
of the firm, such as CoPs (Wenger, 1998) and epistemic communities (Cowan et 
al., 2000). Although both groups learn through repeated interaction and 
developing a common purpose, the social dynamics of their knowledge practices 
vary. With regard to the public sector, Amin and Roberts (2008) suggest that 
professional CoPs learn through social interaction, apprenticeship, and mastery 
of professional knowledge; tend towards incremental innovation and the 
preservation of existing skills; and are subject to regulation that inhibits radical 
change (e.g. by professional associations). Conversely, epistemic communities 
associated with the creative industries (including scientists, researchers, and 
media workers) produce innovation through exploratory projects that bring 
together a variety of actors; depend on mobilising ‘variety, ambiguity, and 
uncertainty’ (p. 361); and are held together by peer recognition, project loyalty, 




codes. Clearly, epistemic communities thrive on exploiting new connections and 
sustaining cognitive distance, while the durable ties characteristic of CoPs 
makes them more adept at developing a specific domain of knowledge achieved 
through cognitive and institutional proximity. However, the practices of both 
types of community are likely to spill over the boundaries of the firm, with 
epistemic groupings in particular likely to draw on interfirm practices of 
knowledge creation.   
 
In television production, interpersonal and interfirm collaboration are frequently 
used to mobilise tacit knowledge that is crucial in commissioning content, due to 
the experiential nature of programming as a cultural good (Lampel et al., 2000). 
The last two decades of regulatory reform within the UK broadcasting industry 
represent a move away from vertical integration as a means to manage 
knowledge and creativity, which supposes the coordination and control of 
technical and creative employees within the firm, towards hybrid forms such as 
project networks and ‘latent organisations’ (Starkey et al., 2000) that are 
organised to exploit the cognitive variety of epistemic communities. In the latter 
forms of organisation, a network broker brings together temporary groups of 
individuals and independent firms that interact through time to deliver 
programme content. The repeated interaction between professionals, based on 
previous experiences of working together and expectations of future dealing, 
may favour the emergence of relational rules that underpin collaboration and 
sustain epistemic communities. However, collaboration across organisational 
boundaries also carries ‘relational risk’, due to an absence of social capital or 
trust among partners, which ‘requires familiarity and mutual understanding and, 
hence, depends on time and context, on habit formation, and on the positive 
development of a relation’ (Nooteboom et al., 1997, p. 314). 
 
In the absence of vertical coordination, interfirm relations are governed by the 
institutional environment that characterises different spaces of economic 
activity. This includes the informal conventions of interaction associated with 
communities, but it also extends to more systematic arrangements for 
coordinating economic exchange including contracting regimes, legal rules, 
property rights, and regulation and industrial policy in general (North, 1990). 
The influence of institutional embedding on practices of creativity is now 
discussed.         
 
2.2 Institutional analysis 
New institutional economics draws attention to the institutional arrangements in 
which the activities of firms and communities are embedded. Institutions are 
read as ‘the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction’ 




conventions and norms of behaviour. While the concept of CoPs emphasises the 
informal basis of learning through mutual interaction, less attention has been 
paid to the influence of formal institutional mechanisms on the sociology of 
their practices. Perhaps a feature of the ethnographic methods often used by 
researchers to provide fine-grained descriptions of the everyday practices of 
CoPs, there remains a tendency to view these groups ‘from within’ (e.g. 
Gherardi, 2009). By contrast, institutional analysis – in viewing social practices 
as shot through with institutional rules of varying origin and formality – creates 
a space for analysing the relationship between communities and the institutions 
that shape their practices.   
 
The influence of formal institutions on organisations and communities can be 
observed in institutional change, as this has the capacity to alter the behaviour of 
these groups. The opportunities created by the dominant institutional framework 
will heavily influence the types of organisations that emerge within an industry 
and their evolution (North, 1990). However, there is no consensus in the 
literature about the relevant actors or processes by which institutional change is 
brought about. The varieties-of-capitalism approach argues that firms are key 
agents of change, ‘constrained by the existing rules and institutions but also 
looking for ways to make institutions work for them’ (Hall and Thelen, 2009, p. 
10). This macro-level perspective has been criticised for its preoccupation with 
the style of national institutions as this hides the variety of institutional 
arrangements that exists within economies. For example, Crouch et al. (2009) 
show that local or regional institutional environments can often deviate from the 
national model, based on the development by companies of local governance 
structures that meet their own market needs. In accounting for local variation, 
one can point towards the action of ‘institutional entrepreneurs’ that participate 
in ‘changing and creating the institutional contexts within which innovators in 
the normal sense operate’ (Crouch, 2007, p. 3). This actor-centred perspective 
on innovation resonates with the theory of CoPs as both see creativity manifest 
in the building of collective relations among self-organising agents. However, 
both perspectives lend considerable weight to the informal organisation of 
innovation-seeking groups, but pay little regard to the structural constraints 
imposed by the broader institutional environment, including the competing 
interests of other social and political agents.      
 
The equation of institutional change with the actions of self-interested firms has 
been met with resistance from other scholars for neglecting the interests of 
government and political conflict in processes of change (Howell, 2003). For 
varieties-of-capitalism analysts, even governmental reform is viewed ‘as a 
process built on coalitional politics, in which segments of capital are usually 




implies a secondary role for states who ‘act largely at the behest of employers’ 
(p. 110). This creates a picture where ‘capitalist political economies and the 
social relations that undergird them are fundamentally nonconflictual; the 
interests of different actors can be effectively coordinated for long periods by 
sets of institutions’ (Ibid). This picture is deficient. Firstly, it assumes that firms 
are relatively homogenous entities and denies the varied interests, histories, 
market strategies, and governance arrangements that organisations possess. 
There are multiple interests at stake in institutional change and, based on their 
heterogeneity, new arrangements produce variegated outcomes for the actors 
involved. Secondly, it assumes that government policy is oriented towards the 
efficient functioning of market economies, with the consequent neglect of its 
broader regulatory role in governing relations between state, market and society 
(Wright, 2009). For example, despite undergoing two decades of market-based 
reform, the full marketization of UK broadcasting has been resisted due to 
concern about safeguarding the public service elements of broadcasting (Deakin 
et al., 2009). While aiming to meet the interests of firms, formal institutional 
arrangements are actually sanctioned by governments steering ‘plural 
economies’ composed of capitalist and non-capitalist interests (Amin, 2009). 
 
These criticisms suggest that no straightforward relationship can be drawn 
between the firm and processes of institutional change. Institutions embody a 
diversity of interests and produce variegated effects, as they represent the 
outcome of imperfect relations among the state, heterogeneous firms, and 
communities. Institutional analysis not only implies studying how these actors 
are involved in the construction of institutions: it also means examining the 
effect that their formation has on the behaviour of firms and communities. 
Institutional analysis develops the theory of CoPs by situating the micro-
practices of innovation undertaken by firms and communities within a wider 
institutional framework that structures or orders those practices. Equally, 
employing a micro-theory of innovation such as CoPs develops institutional 
analysis by opening up a conceptual space in which the influence of regulatory 
and institutional change upon economic practice (i.e. innovation capacity) can 
be studied. 
 
The empirical context for the analysis is the UK broadcasting industry, and 
specifically the deepening relationship between the BBC and the independent 
television production sector. Following a brief overview of the research 
methodology (section 3), the regulatory and institutional reforms affecting the 
UK broadcasting industry over the last two decades are reviewed. The empirical 
material is then presented. In section 4.1, the reforms are assessed against the 
aim of exploiting cognitive variety to bring new competencies to bear on 




affording a greater role to indies in the delivery of BBC programming are 
evaluated from an institutional perspective. Concluding remarks on communities 
and institutions based on the case-study material are made in section 5.  
 
3. Methodology  
 
There are four public service broadcasters operating within the UK: BBC, Welsh 
Authority (S4C), providers of the licensed public service channels (Channel 3, 
Channel 4 and Five), and the public teletext provider (Teletext). As defined by 
statute in the 2003 Communications Act (c.21, section 264), public service 
broadcasting should: deal with a wide range of subject matter; be shown at a 
time relevant to audiences; be balanced in coverage; and be produced with a 
high standard of content, quality, and professional skill and integrity. The 
television sector is regulated by OFCOM (Office of Communications), an 
independent authority created under the 2003 Communications Act to replace 
five separate regulators of the communications sector, including the Independent 
Television Commission (ITC). OFCOM aims to further the interests of ‘citizens’ 
and ‘consumers’ by maintaining plurality in broadcasting provision and by 
promoting competition, where appropriate. The trade association for the 
independent production sector is PACT (Producers Alliance for Cinema and 
Television). Formed in 1991, PACT represents the interests of its members 
(over 450 companies) to governmental bodies (including OFCOM) and 
negotiates production terms with major broadcasters and other purchasers of 
media content. With 26,500 members, BECTU (Broadcasting Entertainment 
Cinematograph and Theatre Union) is the independent trade union for 
employees and freelance workers within the broadcasting industry.  
 
The research is based on 15 semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders 
from the UK television industry conducted in the spring of 2008 (see Table 1). 
A bespoke aide-memoire was prepared for each interview and this acted as a 
checklist for discussing a number of key issues: the current composition of the 
UK television industry; the impact of recent regulatory and organisational 
changes on broadcasters and indies, notably the change in the terms of trade and 
the introduction of the WOCC; the likely sources of creativity and quality in 
contemporary programming and the effect of institutional pressures; and the 
advantages and disadvantages of making programmes through in-house and 
independent television production teams. The interviews (which lasted for an 
hour on average) were tape-recorded and transcribed in full. The transcripts 
were reviewed by the project team and the evidence was categorised into 
different themes based on our reading of the interview data. It was at this stage 
that the concept of cognitive variety was recognised to be of value in 




broadcasting. As such, the process of research adopted a ‘grounded theory’ 
approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) involving the generation of theory through 
the conduct of qualitative research, rather than collecting data that merely 
supports the tenets of extant theory.  
 
Organisation Interviewees 
Ofcom Policy director; Economic advisor 
BBC Programme commissioner; Channel controller; Senior producer; 
R&D manager 
BBC Trust Trustee 
Channel 4 Policy director 
PACT Senior executive 
BECTU Secretary 
Small indie Proprietor 
Mid-size indie Managing director; Finance director 
Large indie Chairman 
Publicly quoted indie Commercial director 
Table 1. List of interviewees 
 
The strength of an interview-based approach is that, by affording the collection 
of in-depth, discursive material from a range of voices, it enables the complex 
effect of regulatory reform upon the organisational strategies of multiple actors 
to be described. A wider range of actors was approached for interview, including 
a further number of prominent indies and broadcasting professionals, but our 
requests were either declined or no response was received. The study is based on 
a limited volume of interview data but the perspectives of the main players 
within the industry (including a range of indie types) are represented. In order to 
triangulate the evidence generated through the interviews, other forms of data 
were collected: quantitative information on the evolving composition of the 
independent production sector; documents mapping the relationships between 
the BBC and the largest independent suppliers of programming; and information 
on innovation and diversity in the BBC’s programming output over time.       
 
4. Regulatory change and UK public sector broadcasting 
 
The BBC was formed under General Manager John Reith in the 1920s with the 
purpose ‘to inform, educate and entertain’. The BBC currently has an annual 
income of £4.6 billion (75% comes from the licence fee) and employs 23,000 
staff (BBC, 2009). In relation to public value, the BBC’s stated mission outlined 
in the current Royal Charter and Agreement (2006) repeats Reith’s mantra and 
sets out six public purposes including sustaining citizenship, promoting learning, 
stimulating creativity, and representing the nations, regions, and communities of 
the UK. According to Born (2004), these Reithian or public service values 




the 1990s: ‘A continually evolving Reithianism animated the BBC’s production 
cultures, as for decades it had informed the shared craft of British 
broadcasting… it formed part of the collective expertise and implicit knowledge 
of programme-makers’ (p. 84). In language reminiscent of the literature on 
CoPs, Born argues that BBC producers identified with a history of programme-
making inflected with Reithian ethics and crafted in particular aesthetic styles, 
such that ‘their attempt to forge knowing links between generic pasts and 
imagined generic futures was their primary mode of professional engagement’ 
(p. 84-5). The ‘public service ideal’ was present in the critical, self-reflexive 
stance of practitioners and debated in editorial and output review meetings, ‘So 
[came about] the desire to innovate in the look or tone of a particular genre, or 
the inclination to tweak a rival’s successful format, or criticism of others for 
failing to deliver on a necessary BBC commitment to popularity or 
distinctiveness’ (p. 85).  
 
Over the last two decades, regulatory and institutional change has altered the 
internal organisation of production within the BBC and changed the relationship 
with the external television production sector. Following the publication of the 
Peacock Report in 1986, the BBC was reorganised in accordance with the 
principles of ‘quasi-markets’ (Le Grand and Bartlett, 1993) as programme-
makers were separated from programme commissioners, the suppliers of 
production resources, to facilitate the benchmarking of costs. The 1990 
Broadcasting Act introduced a production quota for the BBC and ITV which 
meant that 25% of programming by volume had to be contracted out to indies. 
Following a review of the programme supply market by the Independent 
Television Commission (ITC, 2002), a new wave of reforms addressed the 
perceived bias towards incumbent perspectives in the relationship between 
terrestrial broadcasters and the independent production sector. The 2003 
Communications Act realigned the contractual ‘terms of trade’ between 
broadcasters and indies signalling a move away from ‘full funding’ contracts to 
a ‘licensing’ model whereby producers would meet the costs of production but 
retain ancillary rights to the future exploitation of licensed programmes in the 
UK and internationally. This represented the adoption of the ITV terms of trade, 
and the decline of the BBC convention of awarding fully-funded contracts with 
the transfer of rights. This regulatory change helped facilitate the transformation 
of the sector from ‘a pure “cottage” industry of talented creatives, beholden to 
the main broadcasters, to one in which several leading companies now generate 
significant revenues and profits and have attracted the renewed interest of the 
City’ (Mediatique, 2005, p. 3). In April 2007, the BBC’s introduction of the 
WOCC extended the involvement of the independent sector by opening up a 
further 25% window of programming to competition from in-house and external 





The UK government gives three reasons for supporting a greater role for the 
independent production sector in the delivery of public service broadcasting. 
Firstly, introducing competition among a range of producers will ensure the 
‘best’ possible programmes are broadcast (the term ‘efficiency’ is also used in 
this context). The value of competition is largely treated as self-evident, 
‘Competition in the supply of programmes will tend to provide a better product 
for audiences’ (DCMS, 2005a, p. 86). Secondly, the use of independent 
providers promotes plurality in programme content. The WOCC promises to 
‘deliver range and diversity, providing genuine opportunity for all types of 
independent producer (as well as the BBC itself) from all parts of the UK and 
across a wide range of output’ (DCMS, 2006, p. 41). Thirdly, the independent 
sector is seen as a locus of ‘creativity and innovation’ in its own right that can 
deliver ‘additional value’ to the viewer (DCMS, 2005b, p. 9).  
 
Since the late 1990s, a decline in the diversity of programming offered by the 
UK’s public service broadcasters has been detected (Ofcom, 2004). In the five 
years prior to 2003, the volume of new UK-made programmes shown on 
terrestrial television fell dramatically in the genre of education (down 53%), and 
at peak-time in current affairs (down 22%), arts (down 23%), and religion (down 
12%). Over the same period, Ofcom’s review suggested that BBC 1 was 
adopting an increasingly ‘ratings-driven approach’ showing a high proportion of 
drama programmes at peak-time, notably soap operas and long-running series, 
whilst BBC 2’s peak-time volume of light entertainment and factual 
programmes (especially ‘leisure’ shows) grew at the expense of arts and drama 
programming. The review also gathered the views of broadcasting professionals 
on innovation and quality, with many feeling that ‘they are having to adopt an 
increasingly copycat approach in search of ratings’ (p.32) whilst viewers were 
found to ‘resent being repeatedly presented with similar versions of the same 
format’ (p.59). From 2004 to 2008, there has been a further decline in spending 
on programming by the BBC, with programme investment on BBC1 and BBC2 
decreasing by 13% (Ofcom, 2009). The BBC’s budget for investing in new 
content has also come under particular pressure from the need to invest in the 
development of new delivery mechanisms, including i-Player, HDTV, Freesat, 
and digital switchover support (Oliver and Ohlbaum, 2009). Despite these 
trends, the BBC is still rated highly by audiences compared with other public 
service broadcasters in the UK, with a recent Ofcom survey finding that the 
BBC channels scored highest on quality, originality, and being engaging, with 
only C4 rated better on innovation (Ofcom, 2009, p.64-65).  
 
The growing influence of the independent sector in the provision of BBC 




to deliver creativity and diversity in its output. In particular, concerns have been 
raised that extending the role of the independent production sector beyond the 
25% quota may threaten the sustainability of the BBC’s own production 
capability. The Work Foundation (2005) claims that, once the independent 
sector becomes larger than in-house production at the BBC, a ‘tipping point’ 
will be reached whereby ‘independents will increasingly dictate the terms over 
what kind of programmes they want to make’ while the BBC ‘risks a serious 
hollowing-out as a creative organisation by a rapidly growing and newly 
empowered independent sector’ (p.7). From the perspective of the television 
production communities identified by Born (2004), the institutional changes 
may also threaten the reproduction of these groups and the sociology of 
innovation of the broader media community in which they are situated. The 
consequences of this trajectory of change in the BBC’s production strategy are 
now assessed from CoPs and institutional perspectives.    
 
4.1 Cognitive variety    
Following the 1990 Broadcasting Act, the attempt to create an external market 
for programme supply encountered a number of social and institutional effects 
that promoted a tendency towards cognitive proximity, marked by the 
reproduction of an inter-organizational community of television broadcasters 
and producers. Firstly, there was an outflow of ‘indie trailblazers’ from the BBC 
into the independent sector during the 1990s as ‘Ex-BBC producers now 
operating as independents were offered more generous returns than had they 
remained in-house, raising program costs’ (Born, 2002, p. 72). As Bryson et al. 
(1997) note, spin-offs carry the competitive advantage of accumulated expertise 
and industry contacts derived from working with the parent company. For 
example, of the top ten indies used by the BBC in 2007, only Tiger Aspect 
Productions and Wall to Wall Television were not founded or are headed up by 















Key staff Biography 










Channel 4 to co-found 











Managing Director of 
Talkback Productions 
prior to founding Tiger 
Aspect 
Endemol 1994 Entertainment, 
Factual, 
Comedy 
Tim Hincks (CEO, 
Endemol UK) 










Mulville worked in 
BBC radio and 
television before co-
founding Hat Trick 
with Denise 
O’Donoghue and Rory 









Heggessey left position 
as controller of BBC1 
to become CEO of 
Talkback Thames in 
2005 
Lion Television 1997 History Richard Bradley, 
Nick Catliff and 
Jeremy Mills 
(Managing 
Directors)   
Bradley, Catliff and 
Mills left the BBC to 
co-found Lion in 1997  
Shed 
Productions 
1998 Drama Eileen Gallagher, 






Chadwick left Granada 
Television (part of ITV 
productions) to co-
found Shed in 1998  
 
  
Wall to Wall 
Television 




Graham worked as a 
reporter and editor in 
the press before 
founding Wall to Wall 
with Jane Root. In 1997 
he acquired her shares 
as she left to run BBC2.




Productions (founder) BBC’s Head of Light 
Entertainment to 
establish 12 Yard in 
2001 





Neame left position as 
BBC’s Head of Drama 
Commissioning to join 
Carnival in 2005 
Table 2. Top ten independent suppliers to BBC Vision by spend in 2007.  
 
 
Secondly, the high concentration of media companies in London1, the majority 
of which are located in the district of Soho, affords informal interaction outside 
work in the city’s pubs and cocktail bars that engenders common ‘norms of 
thinking and ways of doing which transcend individual firms and industry 
boundaries but characterise the cluster as a whole’ (Nachum and Keeble, 1999, 
p. 30-31). Thirdly, the mobility of freelance workers, who represent the majority 
of employees in the independent sector and over a quarter of workers within UK 
broadcasting organisations, generates knowledge spillover effects as workers 
carry new ideas and tacit knowledge between firms. Finally, the BBC has shown 
a preference for developing long-term relationships with a limited range of 
producers, citing the benefits of secure relationships for stimulating creativity 
and risk taking among programme makers, while causing ‘considerable disquiet 
among those independents who perceived that they were unfairly penalized by 
such a system’ (Deakin and Pratten, 2000, p. 343). The commissioning system 
remained embedded in a set of social conventions familiar to broadcasting 
professionals, favouring production companies set up by former employees with 
experience of those practices and an established reputation. These processes 
supported the reproduction of ‘communities of ideas’ united by a commitment to 
an imagined set of Reithian values that regulated the trajectory of programme 
making across different genres by encouraging producers to steer away from as 
much invention as that which they engendered. Television producers shared a 
mutual understanding of aesthetic styles and ethics, cognitive proximity in other 
words, which was not confined to producers within the BBC, as ‘their output 
formed part of these histories, connecting them to a wider professional world 
beyond the BBC and to common, genre-specific concerns’ (Born, 2004, p. 84).     
This outcome could be read as an attempt by commissioners to maintain the 
CoPs composed of broadcasters and commissioners situated within the formerly 
vertically-integrated structure of the BBC. While such systems of learning have 
been recognised in the literature as significant sources of apprenticeship learning 
and everyday socialisation (Lave and Wenger, 1991), there is greater doubt 




produce radical learning or innovation. How have the more recent reforms since 
2003 affected the reproduction of the competencies associated with these 
production communities? In response to the WOCC, the BBC Trust (2008) 
states that the BBC aimed to reduce the capacity of in-house production teams 
by 15%, with almost 600 redundancies made between 2005 and 2008. 
Mediatique (2005) notes that further downsizing of the BBC caused by the 
WOCC ‘is likely to create a renewed flow of talent to the independent sector’ 
(p.8). In 2007, the BBC commissioned programmes from 211 different indies, 
including 59 newly commissioned, a moderately higher number than in the two 
preceding years. However, the figures relating to new production relationships 
are being treated with caution by the BBC Trust (2008), having been informed 
that ‘independent production companies were often set up by key figures from 
other companies, or by people who have recently left the BBC. As such, these 
production companies might already have established personal relationships 
with commissioners’ (p.65). Television producers working within both the BBC 
and independent production companies were still perceived to share similar 
characteristics, as a BBC programme commissioner told us in interview: 
 
now we just regularly get them all together and actually the in-house 
discovers  that actually they are just like them. They are all about the 
same age, they generally come from the same social background, and 
actually the only difference is one is outside the BBC and one is 
inside.  
 
In addition to possessing some similar cognitive characteristics to incumbent 
producers, it is not clear whether the range of indies commissioned by the BBC 
accords with the principle of variety. The BBC’s preference for maintaining 
relationships with familiar contacts has continued since the introduction of the 
WOCC, as the commercial director of a ‘super-indie’ informed us in interview,  
 
the other key ingredient that I think all of us indies have is that we’re 
looking for people out there who have got good relationships with the 
right people at Channel 4, Channel 5, BBC, and can therefore pick up 
the phone, walk in the door, even mention over lunch we’ve got a 
great idea. It also means that the broadcasters come to you first or 
come to these people first for things and that makes a huge difference. 
 
The use of a narrow range of indies may allow the BBC to reduce relational risk 
by developing durable relationships that seed mutual understanding and trust 
but, at the same time, the tendency to recommission existing producers may 
reproduce the same routines, to the detriment of exploration or novelty-seeking 




conducted in 2005, Ofcom estimated that 70% of the externally commissioned 
programmes made for the BBC were produced by companies with a turnover of 
over £12 million (Ofcom, 2005). Of the indies commissioned in the year after 
the WOCC was introduced, the BBC Trust (2008) reports that 240 had an annual 
turnover of less than £12 million and 19 had annual revenues in excess of £50 
million2. This suggests that the majority of smaller indies commissioned by the 
BBC are each producing a limited volume of programming.   
 
In addition to commissioning indies, another source of variety for the BBC is 
their use of freelance workers: ‘They bring enormous talent, often with more 
than a dash of genius, to British programme-making, and it is the BBC’s job to 
support them in creating great original work’ (BBC, 2004, p. 101). Under the 
WOCC regime, there is greater pressure on the BBC to mimic the independent 
sector’s flexible use of labour as the volume of programming commissioned 
from in-house production teams should vary from year to year, as the chairman 
of a large indie told us in interview:  
 
there’s some wastage of staff [at the BBC] because you’ve got some 
staff who are sitting around developing things hoping they’re going to 
get a WOCC commission and that’s not a very clever use of 
resources. We are much leaner and meaner because we only staff up 
when we get production, you know, where we have as many people as 
we need to service what we make.  
 
The BBC’s projected turn towards a regime of flexible production can be 
subjected to different interpretations. In private sector business networks, 
creativity is theorised to result from the interaction of a distributed community 
of actors that extends beyond the boundaries of the firm. Novelty or innovation 
is, or so corporate executives argue, the product of ‘learning by switching ties’ 
(Grabher, 2004). This intentionally ‘disruptive’ approach to project work is 
designed to exploit cognitive distance, as described by an art director based in 
London, ‘You work with your favourites… but you also try new people, because 
of new ideas, new approaches... you look for freshness’ (quoted in Grabher, 
2004, p. 1501). In this view, a flexible labour market is a critical component of 
an epistemic community of workers that affords the continual reconfiguration of 
relationships in the pursuit of innovation. What this account of creativity omits 
though is that the use of flexible teams is made possible by a cognitive division 
of labour within these firms, as the pursuit of efficiency strips the epistemic 
content away from many roles beyond the ‘core team’. In television production, 
the development of routinized formats allows programmes to be made using 
temporary staff assigned to roles within a Tayloristic production system, as 




                 
very frequently in an indie now the director is brought on after the 
pre-production work has been largely done, they’re brought on just 
before the shoot.  They do the shoot, they take the material into the 
edit where, because it’s a highly formatted piece, they stay for the first 
two thirds of the edit and then leave for it to be completed by the 
series producer and editor.  You may only be on contract to that 
production for eight, ten weeks; you will never see your programme 
completed. You are absolutely a gun for hire to do a job and the job’s 
not a very creative one.   
The BBC’s own experience of using freelance production staff to reduce costs in 
the 1990s also indicates that employment on short-term contracts can inhibit 
learning and innovation, as Born’s (2004) ethnography of the corporation 
highlighted: short working relationships undermined participation in ‘creative 
dialogue’; opportunities for apprenticeship learning were stifled as junior staff 
were enrolled in distinct phases of production but unable to see whole projects 
through; commitment to training and providing professional development 
opportunities to casual employees declined; and production staff became weary 
of sharing new ideas as these were the currency by which new commissions or 
future employment could be secured3. The casualisation of employment also 
undermined commitment or loyalty to the BBC, as ‘the public service ethos at 
its core was attenuated by the new contractualism’ (Born, 2004, p. 191).  
 
Although the BBC Trust’s (2008) first biennial review of the WOCC reports in-
house production teams ‘raising their game’ and ‘rising to the challenge of 
increased competition’ (p.11), evidence was also found that the redundancies 
caused by the restructuring had affected morale and increased anxiety among 
producers. As a policy director from C4 told us in interview, the organisational 
changes at the BBC highlight the balance that needs to be struck between 
fostering a secure institutional environment designed for experimentation that 
‘allows for making mistakes and getting it wrong and learning from the mistakes 
and moving on’, and maintaining a competitive tension which ensures that 
production teams do not ‘settle down into comfort zones just repeating what you 
have been doing for years’. As we noted above, the BBC claims to respond to 
this tension by using freelance producers to bring new competencies to bear on 
in-house programming and thereby increase the level of cognitive distance or 
variety available during the production process. If, however, the pursuit of 
flexibility comes at the cost of the reproduction of ‘public service values’, then 
the injection of variety into the corporation may tip over optimal cognitive 
distance, undermining in-house collaboration and the personal commitment of 
staff to the BBC. This risk is also identified by the Work Foundation (2005) who 




autonomy, good role models, resources (including time), encouragement, 
freedom from criticism, and norms in which innovation is prized and failure is 
not regarded as fatal’ (p. 17).    
 
In summary, opening a new window for the independent sector to compete for 
the provision of BBC programming has not led to the acquisition of the variety 
of new competencies as perhaps intended. In part, this is due to the continued 
displacement of BBC producers into the independent sector caused by the 
organisational reforms, a swathe of whom now have supplier relationships 
through spin-off companies. If many of the independent production companies 
used by the BBC are headed up by former staff this raises doubts about whether 
increasing the potential window for the commissioning of external organisations 
will introduce additional competencies, as the new programme makers may well 
have developed their own knowledge inside the same institution, only now 
supplying the BBC as newly-formed spin-offs. More importantly, the BBC’s 
apparent reliance on a limited range of suppliers to deliver the majority of 
independent programming does not necessarily accord with the plurality of 
provision desired when the WOCC was introduced.  
 
Notwithstanding this cognitive proximity, the private equity funding of these 
spin-offs may also add an element of profit orientation that works as a disruptive 
element of existing common practices, as cases like “Crowngate” seem to 
show4. The recent changes in the relationship between the BBC and the 
independent production sector appear to signal a shift away from what Amin and 
Roberts (2008) term ‘professional CoPs’ to the use of epistemic communities in 
television production. With regulatory and managerial sponsorship, the BBC is 
turning towards a ‘mixed ecology’ of production based on strengthening the 
linkages with external sources of knowledge, embodied within freelance 
producers and independent production companies, to generate innovation 
through the interaction of a variety of actors that extends beyond the formal 
boundaries of the corporation. As the BBC’s own production capacity is eroded, 
the self-policing of norms and quality conventions attributed to professional 
CoPs is threatened by a new organisational logic that thrives, not on the 
stewardship of well-established routines and reproduction of existing 
competencies, but on the management of a distributed network of relationships 
to produce dynamic or innovative capabilities (Teece et al., 1997). This change 
also exposes the BBC to greater ‘relational risk’ stemming from setting up 
commissioning relationships with a higher proportion of independent 
organisations. This article now examines the effect of institutional change upon 
relations between the BBC and the independent television production sector.  





4.2 Institutional change 
Following the 1990 Broadcasting Act, the BBC was able to propagate its own 
culture of production (loosely based on imagined Reithian values) when 
engaging with the independent sector. The 2003 reform in the terms of trade 
created a more profitable but concentrated independent television production 
sector. Mediatique (2008) estimates that the independent production sector 
generated revenues in excess of £2 billion in 2007, having more than doubled in 
size since 2000 when annual income stood at £960 million. This has been 
accompanied by a halving in the number of indies from 800 in the mid-1990s to 
around 400 at the present time (Doyle and Paterson, 2008). Due to a flurry of 
acquisitions over the last decade (see Table 3), the sector is becoming 
increasingly concentrated with the top 10 independent companies accounting for 
65% of the market in 2007 (Mediatique, 2008). The ‘tail’ of small independents 
with annual turnovers of less than £2 million have seen their market share 
decline from 61% in 1993 to just 2% in 2007 (Ibid).  
These changes in the composition of the industry can be related to regulatory 
and institutional change, as this afforded the growth of large production 
companies able to attract capital investment through stock market floatation or 
private equity finance.  The improved terms of trade for indies when supplying 
broadcasters were the product of the government’s desire to reduce the Public 
Service Broadcasters’ market power identified in the ITC’s review as well as 
political lobbying from PACT, the producer’s association. To understand the 
emergence of this institutional change it is critical to review the steps that led to 
the publication of the 2003 Communications Act. A draft Bill was published by 
the government in May 2002. This proposed simplifying the regulation of the 
media, through the creation of a single regulator (Ofcom), and by relaxing the 
rules on media ownership. A joint parliamentary committee, chaired by Lord 
Puttnam, conducted a pre-legislative review of the draft Bill that summer. The 
inquiry heard evidence on the proposed reforms from a series of stakeholders, 
including PACT, the BBC, and the government. The committee agreed with 
PACT that the draft Bill neglected the needs of indies:    
The draft Bill is almost wholly concerned with the interests of 
broadcasters, channels and platform owners and has little to say about 
the need to create a competitive market producing high quality content 
which can appeal domestically and internationally.5 
Evidence was also taken from Greg Dyke, then Director-General of the BBC, 
who questioned PACT’s motive for seeking a code of practice that would 
formalise relations between broadcasters and independent suppliers:   
Remember the Independent Producers’ Organisation is only a trade 




should not believe all people say as Gospel. These are people looking 
for the best interests of their businesses which is perfectly valid, but 
you have to set it in that perspective and, therefore, their aim is to 
maximise both the income and the rights ownership they can get, and 
the House’s is to look after the public interest, so is it really our job to 
make large numbers of indies extremely rich?6  
 
Holding Company Production Companies 
All3Media South Pacific Pictures, North One TV, Lion TV, Lime Pictures, 
IDTV, Company Pictures, ARG TV, Cactus Films, All3Media 
International, Bentley Productions, Maverick Media, MME 
Movement 
IMG TWI, Tigress Productions, Tiger Aspect, Darlow Smithson 
Productions 
RDF Media Group Touchpaper Television, RDF Media, RDF International, Radar TV, 
IWC Media, The Comedy Unit, Presentable, Foundation TV 
Productions 
Southern Star Group Oxford Scientific Films, Darrall Macqueen, Carnival Films and 
Television 
Tinopolis Venner TV, Mentorn, Folio, Sunset & Vine Productions, Music 
Box, Tinopolis, Video Arts Group, APP Broadcast 
Shed Productions Plc Shed Productions, Ricochet, Outright Distribution, Twenty Twenty 
Vision, Wall to Wall 
ITV Productions 12 Yard Productions 
Endemol UK Endemol, Cheetah, Initial, Zeppotron, Brighter Pictures, 
Showrunner, Hawkshead, Victoria Real 
Fremantle Media (RTL 
Group) 
Fremantle Media, Talkback Thames, Grundy Productions, Regent 
Productions 
DCD Media Box TV, Done and Dusted, Iambic Productions, Prospect Pictures, 
September Films, West Park Pictures 
Hit Entertainment Hit Entertainment, Gullane Entertainment, Hit USA Production, 
Guiness World Records 
Mediaset, de Mol Endemol 
Ten Alps Plc Blakeway/3BM, Brook Lapping, Ten Alps TV, Production Co 
The Zodiak Group Bullseye TV, Diverse Productions UK and US 
Two Way Traffic Celador International 
Shine Shine, Firefly, Kudos, Princess 
Table 3. Merger activity since 2006 (PACT in Perspective, 2009) 
Note: Since its publication there have been changes to the data displayed: for instance, IMG 
sold its companies Tigress Productions, Tiger Aspect and Darlow Smithson Productions to 





Tessa Jowell, then culture secretary of the government stated, in turn, that the 
public money allocated to the BBC should also fulfil a wider role in supporting 
the creative economy, opening up new regulatory terrain at the interface 
between the BBC and the independent sector:      
In relation to the broader position of the independent producers, we 
would look very closely at ways in which independent producers 
would be disadvantaged or discriminated against. I have said on many 
occasions that I see, for instance, one of the functions of the licence 
fee, the £2.5 billion which is available to the BBC, as being in a sense 
venture capital for the nation’s creativity, and the use of certainly part 
of that resource to drive a healthy independent sector is very important 
indeed.7  
 
At the government’s request, the publication of the Puttnam report led to a 
review of the relations between television broadcasters and producers by the 
incumbent regulator (ITC, 2002). The government accepted the majority of the 
findings of this review, including the need for ‘terms of trade between 
broadcasters and independent producers [that] are fair and foster an 
economically sound independent production industry’ (DCMS, 2003). The 
institutional ‘rules of the game’ (North, 1990, p. 3) governing the 
commissioning of programming had changed. By allowing indies to retain the 
intellectual property rights to programmes, the new terms fuelled the dramatic 
growth in revenue of the independent sector during the 2000s: the independent 
production sector registered annual growth of 15% since 2005, with the top 15 
indies seeing their revenue grow from £1.1 billion in 2005 to £1.6 billion in 
2007 (Perspective, 2009). This was accompanied by a process of consolidation 
as many small to medium indies were sold to larger companies, leading to the 
emergence of heavily capitalized ‘super-indies’ propelled by external investment 
including opportunities for public floatation. For instance, the chair of PACT 
during the negotiations over the terms of trade, Eileen Gallagher, successfully 
floated her production company, Shed Media, on the AIM stock exchange in 
March 2005.  
 
The BBC’s roster of indies is currently dominated by these so-called ‘super-
indies’. Of the top ten indies used by the corporation in 2007, seven are now 
owned or controlled by parent companies with annual revenues in excess of 
£100 million8. As well as helping to fuel the growth of these companies, it is 
right to ask whether the change in the regulatory environment has altered the 
production strategies of indies. Faulkner et al. (2008) argue that, on the basis of 
having profit-oriented shareholders, larger production companies ‘experience 




example of children’s television producer HIT Entertainment (whose portfolio 
of programmes includes Bob the Builder as shown on BBC CBeebies) which 
generates half of its income through television revenue while ‘the other half 
comes from consumer product licensing of dolls, models and other products that 
feature the character’ (Faulkner et al., 2008, p. 307). For these authors, the 
representation of the independent sector by key stakeholders (producers, policy 
makers, and academics) as ‘creative spaces that liberate the producer from the 
administrative and financial responsibilities found in large bureaucratic 
organizations like the BBC’ (p. 297) is based on a Romantic dualism in which 
artistic values are separated from commercial imperatives, and claim instead that 
‘The artistic and the commercial exist in the same world, but the latter is hidden 
to keep the former sacrosanct’ (p. 300). Preoccupied with the exploitation of 
secondary and tertiary rights, the independent production company, Faulkner et 
al. (2008) claim, ‘does not so much liberate the creative producer as enmesh the 
producer-owner in new financial instrumentalities, which, on current 
programming evidence, generates as much chintz as it does art’ (p. 314).  
 
Our recent round of interviews shed some light on the conflicting imperatives 
facing larger indies. For example, the commercial director of a publicly quoted 
independent indicated that the likely response of the stock market was taken into 
account in programme decision-making:  
 
you’ve got to satisfy the shareholders and promise things to the City 
and then deliver them.  So, yes, of course it affects a lot of things in 
terms of driving the figures… it’s probably one of the things that 
informs the policy: that we should have more returning series and 
formatted shows because they have more commercial value longer 
term.  There are probably people here who would love to make more 
beautifully crafted documentaries on very interesting subjects but 
there’s just not the money in it. 
The ability to retain ancillary rights appears to encourage the production of 
programmes within genres likely to generate further returns, favouring, for 
instance, the making of entertainment formats rather than current affairs 
programmes or documentaries (as the latter tend to have little or no ancillary 
value). This interest in returnable genres does seem to reflect a profit motive, as 
indies ‘with external shareholders, required to deliver profit growth year on 
year, and/or dependent on the vicissitudes of the stock market, are more likely to 
seek recurring income, re-commissions and long programme runs than to place 
greater emphasis on innovation and the approval of peers’ (Mediatique, 2008, p. 
15). Furthermore, the Work Foundation (2005) suggests that to maintain a low 
cost base independent companies are less likely to carry specialist departments 




interaction), and they provide anecdotal evidence that a concern with producing 
returnable formats among larger independents has reduced their interest in 
making one-off films for C4.  
 
At the same time, the rise of the ‘super-indies’ has been associated with growing 
success in generating export revenue, especially through the supply of 
programmes to the US market. The UK independent production sector generated 
a record income of £391 million from overseas television sales in 2008 (The 
Guardian, 2009). Shed Media plc (2008) reports that 30% of its gross profit now 
comes from the US market, the penetration of which has been led by the 
commissioning of formats that have already been successfully broadcast in the 
UK, including BBC programmes World’s Strictest Parents and Who Do You 
Think You Are?. In our recent round of research, we learned of the growing 
importance of international distribution to indies. Using development capital 
from stock market floatation or private equity sources, the larger indies are 
perhaps better positioned than in-house production teams to invest in new 
content. In particular, they have been able to construct transatlantic networks 
aligned to exploiting the multiple revenue opportunities available in both 
television markets, as it was put to us by the commercial director of a ‘super-
indie’, 
 
we have people here who are creating ideas for new shows, new 
formats; if we can get those commissioned, particularly in the UK, (a) 
it drives production business in the UK, (b) it then delivers 
programmes and formats that we can sell internationally and market 
through the international division and (c) we can then take them to the 
US where we’ve got a very good chance of selling them into the US 
networks and then producing again through [the US subsidiary]. 
 
This ‘super-indie’, that possessed two international divisions (including one 
dedicated to distribution to the US market), informed us that most new formats 
produced for the UK market would also be marketed and sold internationally, 
and pitched to the US networks for production by the division for that region. In 
the fortnightly meetings between the executive producers and commercial 
directors of the company, intelligence regarding commissioning opportunities 
for broadcasters in both the UK and the US would be shared, and ideas for 
formats with potential in both markets would be encouraged by the commercial 
actors present.   
 
These developments lend some support to critics of market-based reform, such 
as Georgina Born, who argue the government’s assumption that the independent 




to the House of Lords Select Committee on the BBC’s Charter Review, Born 
highlights the domination of the independent production sector by a handful of 
large companies, increasingly international in focus, that privilege ‘the drive to 
increase profitability over the other social and cultural purposes befitting 
Britain’s PSB system’ (Born, 2005, p. 279). In her view, this results in the 
production of risk-averse, ‘populist programming’ that can secure ‘safe 
commissions’ with the major UK broadcasters and be reformatted for sale in 
other countries. At the same time, the increasing revenue stream of floated 
indies does allow them the financial slack to risk new ideas and new forms of 
content delivery, a strategy that has allowed them to acquire successfully export 
revenue by producing formats able to straddle the UK and US markets. 
However, such progress may hide a lack of appetite to compete for the 
commissioning of ‘thoughtful’ programming in less profitable areas of public 
service broadcasting, as it was put to us by a BBC Trust member.  
 
This perspective, though, does not take account of the role of broadcasting 
organisations in determining the content and style of programmes 
commissioned. According to indies, their turn towards the US market was not 
only about pursuing additional sources of revenue, but was also the product of a 
decline in television revenue available in the UK. In particular, the transfer of 
ancillary rights from broadcasters to producers was perceived to be placing 
downward pressure on the tariff paid by broadcasters for primary licensing 
rights. The chairman of a large indie told us that establishing partnerships with 
production companies competing in other television markets may be necessary 
to cover the perceived shortfall in revenue:  
                  
we’re having to invest upfront more of our ancillary revenue to cover 
the cost of production which means the shows become less profitable, 
are harder to make, harder to finance, and that’s going to impact on 
things because it’ll be harder to take the risks we’ve taken in the past 
because actually, if you like, our margin is going to thin. I think what 
you might start seeing, certainly in our area drama, and I imagine in 
reality as well, are shows that are structured with an eye on both sides 
of the Atlantic. In other words, that will only be possible to be made if 
you have an American partner, which we’ve never done before but 
may have to do in the future.  
 
The BBC’s predominant source of income remains the annual licence fee, a levy 
on all households that use a television. In 2007, the announcement of a 
diminished licence fee settlement triggered a six-year restructuring plan dubbed 
‘Delivering Creative Future’ by the BBC’s current Director-General, Mark 




channels and a multimedia platform (including the BBC’s iPlayer service), the 
settlement represented a move towards a more efficiency conscious corporation 
that would produce ‘fewer, higher quality, programmes’. A freelance producer 
suggested to us that the pressure placed on the programming budget by these 
trends meant that the BBC wanted ‘certainty in their output’ and therefore 
‘tended to go for the certain middle ground’ of programming. On this view, it 
was the preference of programme commissioners for a stock of reliable, 
economically produced programmes that was stifling innovation, as the 
chairman of an independent production company stated in interview: 
 
we’re the ones who kind of champion weird and wonderful ideas and 
we don’t give up but it’s the, as George Bush would describe it, the 
deciders within the broadcasting organisations who are risk averse and 
who kind of have the attitude, ‘ohh, we haven’t seen something like 
that before therefore it doesn’t work’, who make life very difficult.     
 
If broadcasters are becoming more risk-averse when making commissioning 
decisions, this makes it difficult to attribute the perceived drift of formulism and 
repetition into significant segments of the programme schedule solely to the 
commercial imperative facing independent production companies. In our recent 
round of interviews, a senior BBC producer told us that in the current 
environment only a handful of producers are given autonomy over the 
production of ideas, suggesting that the primacy of ‘bottom-up’ creativity 
belonged to a bygone era: 
 
I think those 10 years, about ‘85 to ‘95; there was an intense period of 
self-awareness and experimentation going on. In those years, and 
probably up to the late ‘90s, it was common for a commissioning 
editor to pull in a talented director and say what would you like to do? 
I want to hear your ideas.  That doesn’t really happen anymore. You’ll 
get called in to ask whether you are interested in working on a 
particular project, which has already been pretty well defined by a 
commission.   
 
This casts the BBC’s management of competition between in-house and 
independent production teams in a new light, one in which the pragmatic needs 
of the commissioning function might take precedence over the insights and 
intuitions that emerge from the tacit mental models of television producers, 
whether developed inside or outside the BBC. This highlights that, although 
cognitive variety may be a significant source of creativity, its successful 




innovation in the coordination of relations between television broadcasters and 
producers.  
 
In summary, institutional analysis illustrates the direct bearing that the 
regulatory environment has on practices of innovation, altering the strategies of 
organisations as they respond to new opportunities produced by institutional 
reform. Attending to the process of institutional change showed that the 
production landscape which resulted from the reforms embodied particular 
agents’ interests. One of the key mechanisms of change was political lobbying 
by PACT. The work of this group represented institutional entrepreneurship as 
they used an existing commissioning model (the ITV terms of trade) as a 
resource to lobby for legislative action on the supply of programming to 
broadcasters, thereby challenging the extant norms that guided supply 
relationships between the BBC and indies. As a process of institutional change, 
this resonates with the varieties-of-capitalism approach which regards the firm 
(and collectives e.g. producer associations) as a central actor in economic 
adjustment. However, what this interpretation of innovation neglects is the 
heterogeneity of interests reflected in institutional change. The broadcasting 
industry includes a range of organisations, from multimillion pound ‘super-
indies’ through to ‘lifestyle companies’ sustained by ‘winning one or two 
commissions a year’ (Mediatique, 2005, p. 8). PACT is perceived to be oriented 
towards the interests of larger indies as reflected in the association’s 
subscription fees which are a fixed percentage of independents’ revenue, thereby 
rising with size. For example, a former member of PACT’s governing council, 
Nick Rosen, claimed that he was suspended from his post in 2007 for supporting 
the interests of smaller producers. In an article for The Guardian newspaper, 
Rosen (2007) summarised the issue facing smaller indies: ‘In recent years, the 
large number of small, powerless production companies have seen their access 
to broadcasters diminish and a handful of large, powerful companies have 
strengthened their relationships considerably’.  
 
While it would be wrong to speculate on the validity of Rosen’s claim, his view 
does confirm that institutional change does not reflect necessarily the interests of 
all firms. As an illustration, fully-funded contracts, the alternative model of 
commissioning content that was sidelined in the reforms, carried the advantage 
of covering cost shortfalls that threaten smaller independents lacking the 
financial reserves of their larger counterparts (Deakin et al., 2009). As the 
concept of ‘the firm’ in varieties-of-capitalism approaches hides this diversity of 
interests, it fails to account for the specific patterns of innovation that 
characterise the development of industrial spaces. Institutional change has 




variegated effect on firms and communities the industry’s overall capacity for 
innovation and creativity may actually have declined (Mediatique, 2005). 
    
5. Conclusion  
 
This paper has examined the changing relationship between the BBC and the 
independent television production sector. A series of regulatory and 
organisational reforms over the last two decades has shifted the balance of 
power in favour of the independent production sector as a whole, with revenue 
doubling since 2000 on the back of new opportunities to produce programming 
for domestic broadcasters and to acquire greater export income based on the 
exploitation of ancillary rights. The issue at stake was whether these reforms 
have produced the intended regulatory benefit of stimulating creativity and 
innovation in public service broadcasting. For the independent sector, there have 
been both winners and losers. The change in the terms of trade has attracted City 
money into the sector, favouring the growth of ‘super-indies’ able to export 
lucrative programme formats worldwide. Equally, capitalisation has encouraged 
the consolidation of the sector, such that the interface with broadcasters is 
increasingly dominated by a handful of large indies, as lamented by critics who 
associate the decline of the small or ‘lifestyle’ indie with a loss of diversity in 
programming and the commercialisation of television. For the BBC, the 
introduction of competition between in-house and external production teams is 
undermining the reproduction of its own production communities, as 
commercial imperatives and norms take on greater precedence in the production 
and commissioning of programming. 
 
According to the concept of cognitive distance, the injection of variety into the 
activities of CoPs should be no bad thing. Left alone, the innovative capacity of 
these groups is questionable (Wenger et al., 2002; Nooteboom, 2008). With 
regard to new competencies, extending the role of the independent sector has not 
introduced the novelty intended due to the embeddedness of the BBC’s 
production capabilities in broader ‘communities of ideas’ that already embraces 
producers working within the independent sector (supported by their 
concentration in the media district of Soho). Instead, it is from an institutional 
perspective that greater distance between the BBC and the independent sector 
was detected. Notably, the profit motive facing ‘super-indies’ encourages new 
forms of organisational behaviour quite detached from the Reithian values still 
reified in the BBC’s Royal Charter. The need to deliver year-on-year growth to 
satisfy investors encourages these companies to produce innovative programmes 
within profitable genres, but leaves gaps in other areas of provision. A member 
of the BBC Trust told us that a critical mass of in-house production remained 




as this requires ‘a culture and career set of options that plays to serious, 
thoughtful values. The commercial market, we see, in some of these more 
challenging areas just won’t do it’. The BBC’s growing preference for using 
staff on freelance contracts brings the corporation steadily into line with the 
flexible working practices of the independent sector, and serves to hinder the 
reproduction of production communities that are committed to the public or 
aesthetic qualities of television. Furthermore, the routinisation of programming 
being led by the independent sector, and increasingly replicated by the BBC, 
may render the reproduction of those values less important among producers.  
 
The challenge for the BBC lies in maintaining cognitive diversity in the current 
programming schedule. To maintain variety, the BBC may need to provide 
greater support to the ‘tail’ of smaller independents. For example, C4, which 
works with the widest range of indies of the UK broadcasters, has a talent 
development programme, ‘4Talent’, which invests £10 million per year to help 
create opportunities for individuals and small companies to make progress in the 
television industry, including a regional development programme based in 
Glasgow aimed at supporting SMEs outside Greater London (Channel Four, 
2008). A manager linked to this initiative at C4 stated that the main concern of 
small companies lay in gaining access to programme commissioners, and 
competing with more established independents that have cultivated strong 
relationships with commissioning departments. To use Nooteboom’s (1999) 
terminology, brokering novel relationships such as these would lay down 
‘cognitive bridging’ mechanisms between small independents and 
commissioners, opening up a space through which the mutual understanding and 
knowledge of both parties could be enriched. This may also engender a 
commissioning dynamic that is less commissioner-dominated, in favour of one 
in which the producer’s own ideas are given greater precedence as a source of 
cognitive diversity.  
 
The enactment of this scenario, however, also presents a challenge to the 
literature on learning through communities, which often privileges micro-scale 
processes at the expense of broader structural concerns, such as the regulatory 
and institutional context that shapes the behaviour of organisations in different 
economic sectors. With regard to the recent reform of the UK broadcasting 
industry, insights from institutional theory constitute a useful analytical lens for 
making sense of the new forms of organisational behaviour observed. 
Institutional change altered the strategies of indies by encouraging creativity in 
popular forms of programming, based on the injection of a financially or 
commercially inflected set of values into programme-making. As such, analysis 
of communities of practice – groups regularly depicted as the locus of adaptation 




institutional constraints imposed upon these groups through structural 
mechanisms, a start being the political economy of public commissioning 






1.A survey by Ofcom (2005) found that around 85% of the revenue generated by 
the independent sector was accounted for by production companies based in 
London.   
 
2.This includes non-Network Nations and Regions programming.  
 
3.The challenging working conditions facing many freelance workers within the 
UK television production industry in the 1990s have been well documented – 
falling average earnings, requirements for multi-tasking, and derecognised 
unions (see Ursell, 2000). A recent Skillset (2008) report indicates that 
inequalities have persisted as, for instance, freelance workers in the television 
industry are less likely to receive formal training than permanent employees, 
with 37% of freelancers receiving some training over a twelve month between 
2007 and 2008, compared to 64% of permanent employees. 
 
4.“Crowngate” refers to an incident that happened in 2007 involving the 
promotion of the documentary “A Year with the Queen”, produced for the BBC 
by the independent company RDF Media. The promotional footage was 
misleading regarding the Queen’s behaviour, and at the time some suspected 
that it had been wrongly edited so as to attract viewers. Although the 
investigation concluded that there had not been an intention to defame or 
misrepresent the Queen, it also pointed out that the incident revealed 
misjudgements, poor practice and ineffective control mechanisms (Wyatt, 
2007). 
 
5. Joint Committee on the Draft Communications Bill, Draft Communications 
Bill, Session 2001-02, Vol I, Ev. 289. 
 
6. Joint Committee on the Draft Communications Bill, Minutes of Evidence, Qu. 
539. 
 













8. These are: Kudos (acquired by Shine Group for £35 million in 2006); Tiger 
Aspect (acquired by Endemol for £40 million in 2009); Endemol; Talkback 
Thames; Lion Television (acquired by All3Media in 2004); 12 Yard Productions 
(acquired by ITV plc for £35 million in 2007); and Carnival Films (acquired by 
NBC Universal for £30 million in 2008). AIM listed Shed Media plc, owner of 
Shed Productions and Wall to Wall Television (ranked 8 and 9 respectively in 
the BBC’s top 10), had an annual income of £82 million in 2008. The revenue of 
the other indie making up the top 10, Hat Trick Productions Ltd, is not known 
although a 45% stake in the business was sold to venture capitalists August 
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